Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Insurance Company of North America v. Lanseair
Travel Agency, Inc., Et Al. : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors. Edward M. Garrett.; Attorney for Defendants-AppellantsJohn
D. Parken; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Insurance Co. of N. America v. Lanseair, No. 16604 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1880

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA,
Case No. 16604
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LANSEAIR TRAVEL AGENCY, INC.,
PREBEN H. NIELSEN, et al,
Defendants-Appellants.
---0000000---

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge

John D. Parken
DART & STEGALL
430 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent
Edward M. Garrett
144 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

Attorney for DefendantsAppellants

I:
I __ ;

. "; r-,c;and
~ '.Library
,_ . _.J Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA,
Case No. 16604
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
LANSEAIR TRAVEL AGENCY, INC.,
PREBEN H. NIELSEN, et al,
Defendants-Appellants.
---0000000---

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge

John D. Parken
DART & STEGALL
430 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent
Edward M. Garrett
144 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

Attorney for DefendantsAppellants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
NATURE OF CASE .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

2

ARGUMENT .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

5

.

.

.

.

.

POINT I
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
A.

B.

C.

Upon introduction of the indemnity
agreement and the canceled check
by which payment under the bond
was made, plaintiff INA established
a prima facie case.
. ...

6

The trial court's findings of fact
are presumed valid and will not be
disturbed if based upon any substantial evidence.

12

Defendant Nielsen has utterly
failed to demonstrate that his
personal indemnity agreement
was revoked prior to Lanseair's
default.
. . . . . . . . . . .

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
i OCR, may contain errors.

Page

(1)

The alleged letter was
never received.

15

(2)

The ATC was not INA's agent.

17

(3)

The attempted revocation was
not timely.

20

The alleged letter was not
sufficient.

22

(4)

D.

E.

Lanseair's default occurred while
the ATC was entitled to protection
under the bond.
. ..... .

25

The trial court's evidentiary
rulings are correct, but any
technical errors are harmless
in any event.

29

(1)

The Schedule Bond.

29

(2)

The documents received
by the ATC.
. ...

30

The alleged credits.

33

(3)

POINT I I
THE ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED TO INA SHOULD
BE INCREASED . . . . . . . .
. . . .
CONCLUSION . • . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . . . . . . ·

ii
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36

39

CASES CITED
Page
American Surety Company v. Blake,
261 Pac. 239 (Idaho 1927)

21

American Surety Company of New York v. Blake,
27 P. 2d 972 (Idaho 1933)

22

Beckstrom v. Beckstrom,
578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978)

39

Bramel v. Utah State Road Commission,
24 Utah 2d 50, 465 P.2d 534 (1970)

13

.

Campbell v. Gowans,
35 Utah 268, 100 Pac. 397 (1909)

16-17

Cannon v. Wright,
531 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1975)

14

Carroll v. National Surety Company,
24 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1928)

11

Dockstader v. Walker,
29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526 (1973)

13

Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v.
Harrison, 274 S.W. 1002 (1925)
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v.
Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P.2d 919 (1943)

9-11
7

Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v.
Maus, 514 P.2d 61 (Oregon 1973)

38-39

Insurance Company of North America v. Brehm,
487 P.2d 387 (Oregon 1970)
.....

19-20

Insurance Company of North America v. Hoyt,
419 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1969) . . . . . . 24-25, 27-28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iii

Page

Lander v. Phoenix Indemnity Company,
329 S.W.3d 951 (Texas 1959)

11

Nance v. City of Provo,
29 Utah 2d 340, 509 P.2d 365 (1973)

13

Pettingill v. Perkins,
2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954)

30

Porcupine Reservoir Company v. Lloyd w.
Keller Corporation, 15 Utah 2d 318,
392 P.2d 620 (1964)
....

30

R. C. Tolman Construction Company, Inc.,
v. Myton Water Association, 563 P.2d
780 (Utah 1977) . . . . . . . . .
Standard Accident Insurance Company v. Fell,
2 So.2d 519 (La. 1941)
.....

12-13
8-9

State v. Kelbach,
23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297 (1969)

30

State v. Valdez,
19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P.2d 53 (1967)

30

Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and
Investment Company, 3 Utah 2d 121,
279 p. 2d 709 (1955)
....

37-38

Town and Country Disposal, Inc. v. Martin,
563 P.2d 195 (Utah 1977)
....

12

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., v. Midwest Realty
& Finance, Inc., 544 P.2d 882
(Utah 197 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23-24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iv

AUTHORITIES CITED
Page
29 American Jurisprudence (2d) ,
Evidence §193

16

29 American Jurisprudence (2d),
Evidence §196

16

75 American Jurisprudence (2d),
Trial §167 . . . . .

30

17 Corpus Juris Secundurn,
Contracts §229(5}

7

Utah Rules of Evidence,
Rule 63
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31-33

v
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
LANSEAIR TRAVEL AGENCY, INC.,
PREBEN H. NIELSEN, et al,

Case No. 16604

Defendants-Appellants.
---0000000---

NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff-respondent Insurance company of North
America (hereinafter "INA") commenced this action in the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, seeking to enforce
an indemnity agreement that defendant-appellant Preben H.
Nielsen (hereinafter "defendant Nielsen") executed personally as well as on behalf of his corporation, Lanseair
Travel Agency, Inc.,

(hereinafter "Lanseair").

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was tried before the Honorable James
S. Sawaya on January 25 and 26, 1979.

Defendant Lanseair

Travel Agency, Inc., filed no answer and made no appearance
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and its default was entered.

(R. at 195.)

An order of

dismissal was entered as to defendant Rulon DeYoung on
February 6, 1979 (R. at 355-56); thereafter, Judge Sawaya
entered judgment against Lanseair and defendant Nielsen on
March 19, 1979.

(R. at 397-98.)

Defendant Nielsen's

Motion (R. at 399-407) to Alter or Amend the Judgment was
denied on July 23, 1979.

(R. at 412-13.)

The dismissal of

Rulon DeYoung and the Judgment against Lanseair have not
been appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
INA respectfully requests that this Court affirm
the Judgment entered against defendant Nielsen and, on the
basis of its cross-appeal (R. at 422-23), order an additional award of attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Nielsen made application to INA for the
inclusion of his Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., on a Schedule
Bond by which INA bonded numerous other travel agencies.
(Tr. at 6; R. at 577.)

The issuance of such a bond was a

necessary prerequisite for Lanseair to gain appointment as
travel agent by the Air Traffic Conference of America
(hereinafter "the ATC").

(Tr. at 144; R. at 715.)

The ATC

is an airline industry association that acts as a clearing
house for airline passenger tickets on behalf of travel
agencies and the various airlines.

(Id.)
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3

In order to induce INA to bond Lanseair, which was
a new and unproven corporation lacking any experience in the
travel agency business, both Lanseair and defendant Nielsen
(who was its majority stockholder, president, and secretary
and also a member of its board of directors) executed an
indemnity agreement.

(Tr. at 4; R. at 575.)

By this agree-

ment, Lanseair and defendant Nielsen agreed faithfully to
perform all of their obligations to the ATC and to indemnify
INA from any loss, costs, attorney's fees, or other expenses
which INA might sustain as a result of having included
Lanseair on its Schedule Bond "or any continuation thereof."
The personal indemnity agreement also provided that INA
should
have the exclusive right to adjust, settle,
or compromise any claim under this obligation, and any voucher or other evidence
of any loss costs and expenses paid in
good faith by the surety shall be prima
facie evidence of the fact and extent of
the liability of [defendant Nielsen]
Based upon defendant Nielsen's application on
behalf of Lanseair and his personal indemnity agreement,
INA bonded Lanseair under its Schedule Bond.
52; R. at 721-23.)

(Tr. at 150-

As a result, Lanseair was enabled to

enter into a sales agency agreement with the ATC.

8-P.)

(Exhibit

This sales agency agreement, which remained in force

through September, 1974, permitted Lanseair to operate as a
travel agency and to sell and issue tickets on behalf of the
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various airlines.

Under the terms of the agreement, Lanseair

was obligated to remit to ATC on the 10th, 20th, and last
day of each month the net value of all airline tickets
issued during that reporting period, less its commissions.
(Tr. at 112; R. at 683.)
The checks (Exhibits 10-P and 11-P) issued to the
ATC for the first two reporting periods in September, 1974,
were dishonored by Lanseair's bank.
729-30.)

(Tr. at 158-59; R. at

Thereafter, Lanseair did not attempt to make

further remittances to the ATC.

(Tr. at 2 3 4 ; R. at 8 0 5.)

The dishonor of these checks and Lanseair's failure to remit
thereafter constituted defaults under its sales agency
agreement.

(R.

at 389.)

The ATC was protected from such

default, to the extent of $10,000, by INA's bond.

(R.

at

383-84 and 388.)
Both INA and the ATC notified defendant Nielsen of
Lanseair's defaults.
160.)

(Exhibits 2-P and 3-P; also Tr. at

INA also advised him that it would seek reimbursement

under his personal indemnity agreement.

(Exhibit 2-P.)

Defendant Nielsen responded only with the assertion that a
letter he claimed to have written to the ATC on August 23,
1974, shielded him from all possible liability; he made no
effort to cure or minimize Lanseair' s default.

(Exhibits 2-P

and 3-P.)

-4-
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Lanseair had issued on behalf of seven airlines a
total of some $15,000 worth of domestic airline passenger
tickets for which it made no remittance to the ATC.
183; R. at 754.)

(Tr. at

In accordance with the usual industry

practices, the various airlines submitted to the ATC documentation of the passenger tickets with respect to which Lanseair
had defaulted.

(Exhibit 37-P and Tr. at 167.)

Based upon

this documentation, the ATC filed a claim against INA under
the provisions of the Schedule Bond.
at 168-70.)

(Exhibit 28-P and Tr.

On January 22, 1975, INA paid $10,000 to the

ATC, which amount represented its full bond limit with
respect to Lanseair.

(Exhibit 32-P and Tr. at 173-74.)

This $10,000 payment was subsequently disbursed on a pro
rata basis to the various airlines that had sustained a loss
on account of Lanseair's default.

(Tr. at 175-177; R. at

746-48.)
By this action, INA seeks to recover this loss,
its expenses and attorney's fees from defendant Nielsen on
the basis of his personal indemnity agreement.

ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY

REVERS IBLE ERROR.
Even though he made no effort to secure their
presence, defendant Nielsen complains vociferously that no

-5-
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employees of INA were present at the trial and protests that
the trial judge did not view the facts and testimony in a
light favorable to him.

While defendant Nielsen's dis-

enchantment with the outcome of the trial is understandable,
his complaints do not constitute grounds for reversal.

A.

Upon Introduction of the Indemnity Agreement and the

Canceled Check by Which Payment Under the Bond Was Made,
Plaintiff INA Established a Prima Facie Case.
Both commercial and informal sureties commonly
require that the principal whose performance they are about
to guarantee agree to indemnify them in the event that they
are called upon to cure a default.

Such agreements not

on~

afford the surety a measure of protection in the event of a
default, they also discourage needless default.

These

indemnity agreements commonly contain either a "conclusive
evidence" or a "prima facie evidence" clause.

The present

indemnity agreement contains the latter type, the so-called
"prima facie evidence" clause.

The admitted purpose of

such

clauses is to relieve the surety from the enormous task of
having to prove every element of its principal's default and
the obligee's loss in order to recover from an indemnitor.
Although there is some split of authority among
the jurisdictions as to whether "conclusive evidence"
clauses are enforceable, the overwhelming majority of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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jurisdictions, if not all, routinely enforce "prima facie
evidence" clauses.

Corpus Juris Secundum reports that:

[A] "conclusive evidence" clause of an
indemnity contract, that a voucher showing payment shall be conclusive evidence
of the liability, has been held void,
although the contrary has also been held;
and such a clause also has been sustained
if containing or permitting an exception
in the case of fraud.
A clause that in case of the payment
of a compromise sum by a surety company in
settlement, an itemized statement thereof,
verified by the company officers, shall be
prima facie evidence of the fact and extent
of the indemnitor's liability has been
sustained.
17 C.J.S. Contracts, §229(5)
added) .

(footnotes omitted, emphasis

The indemnity agreement presently before this Court

contains the provision that "any voucher or other evidence
of any loss, costs and expenses paid in good faith by the
Surety shall be prima facie evidence of the fact and extent
of the liability" of defendant Nielsen.

(Exhibit 1-P.)

This Court noted without comment or concern the
existence of a similar "prima facie evidence" clause in the
indemnity agreement at issue in Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Company v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P.2d 919
(1943).

Therefore, while this Court has never expressly

ruled upon the precise issue, it is apparent that Utah
follows the universally accepted proposition that "prima
facie evidence" clauses are enforceable.

-7-
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In Standard Accident Insurance Company v. Fell,
2 So.2d 519 (La. 1941), a personal indemnitor challenged

t~

enforceability of a conclusive evidence clause by which he
had agreed "that the vouchers .
company of any claim

showing payment by the

. shall be conclusive evidence of

the fact and amount of liability

. provided that such

payment shall have been made by the company in good faith.
2 So.2d at 524.

At the trial, the bonding company

placed in evidence the application that contained the
indemnity agreement and its canceled check that had been
issued in payment to the obligee.

2 So.2d at 522.

On

appeal, the personal indemnitor argued that a sufficient
case against him had not been established since the bonding
sustain~

company had not proven that the obligee had in fact
a loss on account of the principal's default.

The

appella~

court rejected this contention, noting its approval of the
proposition that:
Such stipulations as the one under
consideration should be held to be conclusive upon the "risk" [i.e., the
principal] in an action brought against
him by the insurer to recover indemnity
for any moneys paid by it to the insured
in settlement of a loss coming within the
terms of a policy of guaranty insurance,
in the absence of fraud or collusion
between the insurer and the insured.
It
is unconscionable, in our opinion, tha~
the insurer, after settling in good faith
a loss under the policy with the insured,
should be compelled to bear the burden of
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protracted litigation with the "risk", in
order to recover reimbursement for moneys
so expended for the use and benefit of
such "risk".
2 so.2d at 525 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

Likewise,

it would have been unreasonable and impractical for the
trial court to have insisted that, having bonded Lanseair in
reliance upon defendant Nielsen's personal indemnity agreement and having made good Lanseair's default in its obligations to the ATC, INA formally prove each and every element
of Lanseair's default.

It would have been particularly

unreasonable for the trial court to have required such
formal proof from INA in view of the fact that defendant
Nielsen presented no evidence whatsoever of any bad faith on
the part of INA and, moreover, did not even raise that issue
in his pleadings.
In Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v.
Harrison, 274 S.W. 1002 (Texas 1925), a "conclusive evidence"
clause was held to be enforceable notwithstanding that the
personal indemnitor had proven to the satisfaction of a jury
that the obligee in fact had not been entitled to payment
from the surety.

The personal indemnitor had purchased

"traveler's checks" from the American Express Company.

Some

of these checks had been lost and, in seeking replacements,
he had been required to provide a bond to guarantee his
statement that he had not voluntarily disposed of the
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checks.

The bonding company in turn required that he

execute an indemnity agreement that contained a provision
that any "voucher or other evidence of payment" by the
bonding company would constitute conclusive evidence of the
loss.

The missing checks were later negotiated with

forg~

signatures and, when they were eventually received by
American Express, a claim was made against the bonding
company, which paid the value of the checks.

Thereafter,

the bonding company sought to recover this loss from the
personal indemnitor on the basis of the conclusive evidence
clause.

The trial court refused to enforce the clause

because the jury found that the signatures on the negotiated
checks were forgeries and that American Express should not
have made payment.

On appeal, however, it was held that

this question was beyond the scope of the appropriate
inquiry since the bonding company had proven that it had
paid American Express and the personal indemni tor had agreed
that such proof would constitute conclusive evidence of his
liability to the bonding company.

In so holding, the cour~

indicated its approval of the proposition that:
The expense, delay, trouble, and risk of
loss to the guarantee company is a sufficient safeguard against an unwarranted
payment; and, without such a stipulation
as complained of here, guarantee companies
could not safely do business anything like
as cheaply as they do, and to the evident

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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advantage of the parties and of the general
public.
274 S.W. at 1004-05.

If a conclusive evidence clause such

as was at issue in Harrison is enforceable, then,

~

fortiori

a mere prima facie evidence clause such as that agreed to by
defendant Nielsen in this action must be fully enforceable.
Such clauses were also enforced in

Carroll v. National

Surety Company, 24 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1928), and in Lander
v. Phoenix Indemnity Company, 329 S.W.2d 951 (Texas 1959).
In this case, defendant Nielsen's indemnity
agreement (Exhibit 1-P) was admitted without objection.
(Tr. at 6; R. at 577.)

Additionally, the canceled check by

which INA made payment to the ATC on account of Lanseair's
default was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 32-P.

Defendant

Nielsen's only objection to this exhibit was that it was
hearsay:
MR. DART: We offer Exhibits 29 and
32, Your Honor.
MR. GARRETT: My objection, of course,
Your Honor, is based upon the fact
the check is issued on hearsay
piled on hearsay.
Transcript at 174 (R. at 745).
hearsay:

The check, of course, is not

it was not admitted to prove the truth of anything

stated in it, rather it was admitted for the purpose of
proving that INA in fact paid the sum of $10,000 to the ATC.
Accordingly, the only objection raised to the admission of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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this exhibit was totally without merit.
Considering only Exhibits 1-P and 32-P, INA
established a prima facie case.

From that point on, it was

incumbent upon defendant Nielsen to introduce sufficient
testimony or evidence to prove the invalidity of INA' s prima
facie case.

As will be demonstrated infra, not only did

defendant Nielsen fail to prove any defense to INA's case,
INA went much further and actually proved Lanseair 's default
through direct evidence.

B.

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Presumed Valid

and Will Not Be Disturbed If Based upon Any Substantial
Evidence.
In this action, INA seeks only to enforce defendant
Nielsen's written contract through the recovery of money
damages; therefore, this is an action at law rather than in
equity.

The Findings of Fact made by the trial court are tc

be indulged with a presumption of validity and will not be
disturbed by this Court on appeal if there is any substantial evidence in the Record to support them.

Town and

Country Disposal, Inc. v. Martin, 563 P.2d 195 (Utah 1977)
(" [T]he findings and judgment of the trial court should oot
be upset on appeal if there exists any substantial evidence
in the record supportive of the lower court's conclusions."!·
R. C. Tolman Construction Company, Inc., v. Myton Water
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Association, 563 P.2d 780 (Utah 1977); Dockstader v. Walker,
29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526 (1973)

("[I]t is our duty to

sustain the ruling of the trial court where there is competent
evidence to sustain it."); Nance v. City of Provo, 29 Utah
2d 340, 509 P.2d 365 (1973)

("It is our duty on appeal to

affirm the trial court in its findings of fact where there
is competent evidence to support those findings.").
This Court has frequently reiterated that the
trial court's Findings of Fact are presumed vaild, and held
that those findings are to be disturbed only when there is
no evidence to support them.

For example, in Bramel v.

Utah State Road Commission, 24 Utah 2d 50, 465 P.2d 534
(1970)

this Court held that the fundamental rule of appel-

late procedure was that:
[I]t is the trial judge's prerogative to
find the facts; and this includes judging
the credibility of the witnesses and the
evidence, and drawing whatever reasonable
inferences may fairly be derived therefrom.
It is therefore . . . accurate to say that
on review we survey the evidence in the
light favorable to the findings, whichever
party they may favor; and that they will
not be disburbed on appeal if they are
supported by substantial evidence.
465 P.2d at 535-36 (footnote omitted).
In his challenge to the Findings, defendant Nielsen
charges that they "are contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence."

(Br. App. at 11.)

This is not only a mis-
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

statement of the applicable standard, it is also a tacit
admission that there is evidence in the Record that supporb
the Findings.

This Court's observation in Cannon v. WrigM,

531 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1975), is directly applicable to

defen~m

Nielsen's contention:
[The appellant) misconceives and misstates
his duty on appeal in attempting to upset
the findings and judgment. His brief states
that the trial court erred in making the
above stated findings against "the clear
weight of the evidence." This is not an
equity case, but a law case, wherein any
substantial evidence will support the
findings and judgment.
531 P.2d at 1292 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
Accordingly, so long as there is some substantial evidence
in the Record to support the trial court's Findings, this
Court will not disturb those findings.

C.

Defendant Nielsen Has Utterly Failed to Demonstrate

~rt

His Personal Indemnity Agreement Was Revoked Prior to
Lanseair's Default.
Defendant Nielsen's entire contention that his
personal indemnity agreement was revoked prior to the
default of Lanseair is predicated upon a letter that he
alleges he wrote and mailed to the ATC on August 23, 1974.
Defendant Nielsen's "yellow copy" of this alleged letter
admitted as Exhibit 46-D.
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w~

(1)

The Alleged Letter Was Never Received.

The only evidence of the preparation or mailing of this
letter was that given by defendant Nielsen himself.

(Tr. at

77-78; R. at 648-49.) On the other hand, Mrs. Darlene Dolan,
an employee of the ATC, testified that she had with her all
of the ATC's files relating to Lanseair; that she had searched
those files for the original or any copy of this letter; and
that she had been unable to find either the letter or any
evidence that it had ever been received.
at 757-60.)

(Tr. at 186-80; R.

Mrs. Dolan also testified that, had such a

letter been received, a change-of-ownership procedure would
(Tr. at 189-90; R. at 760-

have been commenced by the ATC.
61.)

It was her testimony, however, that no such procedure

was in fact commenced.

(Id.)

Moreover, while defendant

Nielsen testified that the alleged letter had been mailed to
the ATC at 1000 Connecticut Avenue in the District of
Columbia, Mrs. Dolan's uncontradicted testimony was that the
ATC had moved to another address some two years before the
date of the alleged letter and mail was no longer forwarded.
(Tr. 206-07; R. at 777-78.)
Based upon this testimony, the trial court concluded
that defendant Nielsen had failed to prove that the alleged
letter of August 23, 1974, had ever been received by the
ATC.

(R. at 384-85 and 388-89.)

The trial court's Findings

and Conclusions with respect to the alleged letter are
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entirely correct.

Although a presumption does arise that a

letter was delivered from testimony that it was mailed, this
presumption is dependent upon the letter being correctly
addressed and is completely rebutted by evidence that it ws
not received.

American Jursiprudence reports the rule as

being that:
Where proof is given that a letter
has been duly mailed, a presumption of
the receipt of the letter by the sendee
arises.
On the other hand, proof of the
failure of a letter to arive at its
destination raises a presumption that
it was never mailed.
29 AmJur 2d Evidence, §193 at 246.

The presumption of

receipt, however, is totally dependent upon the letter

bei~

properly addressed:
A correct address is one of the essential elements on which the presumption of
the receipt of a letter from evidence of
its proper mailing is founded; as a general
rule, a failure to show that the letter was
correctly addressed will deprive the sender
of the benefit of such presumption.
There is no presumption that the addressee
of a letter received it from the fact that
it was not returned to the sender, if it
was not directed to the place at which the
addressee resided at the time.
29 AmJur 2d Evidence, §196 at 249-50.
This principle has been accepted by this court.
For example, in Campbell v. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, 100 Pac.
397 (1909), a witness testified that he wrote and mailed a
letter containing directions material to the suit.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As in

this case, there was also testimony that the letter had not
been received by the addressee.

This Court held:

The mailing of a letter postpaid and
properly addressed to a person shown
to reside in a city or town to which
the letter was addressed creates no
legal presumption, but a presumption
or inference of fact, that it reached
its destination.
. . The testimony
of the witness . . . is therefore some
evidence that the letter testified to
by him was received .
. in the due
course of mail.
The defendants, however,
testified that no such letter as testified to .
. was received by them.
On such question we think the evidence
preponderates in favor of the defendants
100 Pac. at 403 (citation omitted, emphasis added).

Likewise,

in this case, the trial court's Finding that the alleged
letter was never received is well supported by the Record.
Moreover, even if defendant Nielsen had proven
that his alleged letter of August 23, 1974, had actually
been delivered to the ATC, there are at least three further
conclusive reasons why that letter could not serve as a
valid defense.

A finding in favor of INA on any one of

these would be sufficient to affirm the judgment.
(2)

The ATC Was Not INA's Agent.

The alleged

letter upon which defendant Nielsen relies so heavily was
directed to the ATC, not to INA.

The trial court found that

since the ATC was not INA's agent, notice to the ATC would
have been insufficient to terminate defendant Nielsen's

-17-
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obligations to INA.

(R. at 390.)

In an effort to demonstrate that the ATC was
somehow INA's agent in connection with the Lanseair bond,
defendant Nielsen relies upon two theories.
merit.

Neither has any

The first is that the bond application (Exhibit

l~)

stated that it was to be given by the travel agent to the
In support of this theory, defendant Nielsen relies

ATC.

solely upon the following title which appears on the

rever~

side of the application form:
Application for bond given by travel agent
to Air Traffic Conference, Washington, D. C.
Even a casual consideration of the language will reveal that
the phrase "given by travel agent to Air Traffic Conference"
indicates to whom the bond is to be given, not to whom the
application for the bond is to be given.
found.

The trial court sc

(R. at 382.)

The second prong of defendant Nielsen's contentioo
is that the application containing the personal indemnity
agreement (Exhibit 1-P) was provided to him by the ATC.
(See, e.g., Br. App. at 4.)

As manager of the ATC' s Finan-

cial Affairs Division it was Mrs. Darlene Dolan's responsibility to verify that travel agents were bonded and handle
the claims in the event of defaults.

It was her uncontradic:

testimony that the ATC received bonds from many sureties
(Tr. at 150; R. at 721) and that the ATC never provided
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prospective travel agents with bond applications (Tr. at
185-86; R. at 756-57).

Moreover, defendant Nielsen's

repeated protestations (e.g., Tr. at 77; R. at 648) that he
had never dealt with, nor even heard of, INA are conclusively refuted by Exhibit 6-P, which contains a letter in
which he states "we have applied to Insurance Company of
North America for transfer present bond to our name."
at 83-84; R. at 654-55.)

(Tr.

There is a great deal of sub-

stantial, credible evidence not only that the ATC was not
INA's agent in connection with the Lanseair bond but also
that defendant Nielsen knew precisely with whom he was
dealing.
Additionally, even if the ATC had acted as an
intermediary in connection with defendant Nielsen's negotiations with INA, the ATC would not thereby have become an
agent of INA for the purpose of receiving notification of
defendant Nielsen's desire to terminate his obligations as
personal indemnitor.

A case meeting the precise question

whether the rights of a bonding company against its indemnitor
can be prejudiced by the acts and knowledge of the obligee
is Insurance Company of North America v. Brehm, 478 P.2d 387
(Ore. 1970).

In that case, the obligee actually provided

the principal with an application to the bonding company,
which issued a bond upon receipt of his indemnity agreement.

-1'3-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

After sustaining a loss on the bond, the surety sought
reimbursement from the indemni tor, who defended on the basis
that recovery was barred by misrepresentations made by the
obligee.

The Oregon Supreme Court rejected all such claims,

holding:
Before learning of the alleged misrepresentations, [the bonding company] in
good faith had accepted liability to
the bank relative to the transaction
in question under its bond. This is,
we think, a material change of position
induced by [the indemnitors'] promise.
As to [the bonding company], the transaction was no longer voidable.
478 P.2d at 391.

Accordingly, the trial court correctly

rejected defendant Nielsen's contention that his alleged
letter to the ATC could somehow relieve him of his

contr~~L

obligations to INA.
(3)
Timely.

The Attempted Revocation Was Not

Defendant Nielsen's alleged letter to the ATC

cou~

not have relieved him of his obligations to INA even if it
had been received because the Lanseair default occurred
before the revocation could have become effective.

Even

assuming, arguendo, that defendant Nielsen's personal
indemnity obligation to INA was revocable, it could be
terminated only upon sufficient notice to allow INA to
protect its interests.
The practical and just proposition that one
desiring to terminate an indemnity agreement must give
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sufficient notice to permit the surety, in turn, to protect
its interests has long been accepted.

For example, such a

rule was recognized and applied by the Idaho Supreme Court
in American Surety Company v. Blake, 261 Pac. 239 (Idaho
1927).

After sustaining a loss on a bank's bond, the surety

brought an action against the indemnitor, who then claimed
to have sent notice to the surety that he was no longer
associated with the bank and was revoking his indemnity
agreement.

The Idaho Supreme Court held that the indem-

nitor's liability would not be terminated immediately upon
the receipt of such notice, but only upon the expiration of
a period of time sufficient for the surety to take reasonable steps to protect itself:
It is true that the notice of the
indemnitors to the surety company was
sufficient to absolve them from further
liability accruing after a reasonable
time within which the surety could
secure its own release, if it chose,
by giving notice of withdrawal .
261 Pac. at 241 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, while a

personal indemnitor may be able to terminate his undertaking
upon notice, he must allow his surety a sufficient length of
time to protect its interests.
Contrary to defendant Nielsen's assertion in his
Brief (Br. App. at 11), the requirement of reasonable notice
was reaffirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in the second
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appeal in the Blake case:
On the former appeal of this case to this
court, it was definitely held that the
indemnitors to the surety company could,
by notice, absolve themselves from liability, after a reasonable time in which
the surety could secure its own release
from obligation to the state.
American Surety Company of New York v. Blake, 27 P. 2d 972 at
974 (Idaho 1933)

(emphasis added).

In this case, the bond

under which Lanseair was included at defendant Nielsen's
request required INA to give the ATC at least 30 days
~

advance notice of its intention to terminate coverage as
Lanseair.

(See, Point I (D) , infra.)

Accordingly, defendant

Nielsen would have to have given INA at least 30 days

noti~

before his obligation as personal indemnitor could have
terminated.

~~

Since the Lanseair default occurred within 30

days of the date of the alleged letter, his obligation witl

i

respect to the Lanseair default would have been unaffected. '
(4)

The Alleged Letter Is Not Sufficient.

The alleged letter of August 23, 1974, could not have
terminated defendant Nielsen's obligation to INA because it
does not contain a plain statement that he is revoking his
indemnity agreement.

The alleged letter recites that

defendant Nielsen and E. L. Hardy have sold their Lanseair
stock to Rulon DeYoung, who will thereafter have control of
the business and then states:
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Please change your records accordingly,
and also be notified that P. H. Nielsen and
E. L. Hardy will assume no personal liability
or responsibility in connection with the
future business transactions of Lanseair
Travel Agency, Inc., this also applies to
any personal liability or guaranty with
the ATC Bond. Please notify your bonding
company of this change.
Exhibit 46-D (emphasis added).

The only request is that the

ATC notify its "bonding company of this change."
was Lanseair's bonding company, not the ATC's.

First, INA
Moreover,

the letter only requests that the ATC notify INA of the
change of ownership.

It does not even request that INA be

advised that defendant Nielsen wishes to revoke his personal
indemnity agreement.
This Court recently articulated the standards
which notice must meet in order to terminate a guarantee
agreement.

Presumably, notice would also have to meet the

same standards in order to terminate a contract of indemnity.
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. Midwest Realty & Finance, Inc.,
544 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975), this Court held:
By duly executing .
. continuing
guaranties, knowing that others .
would rely and act thereon, defendant
became bound thereby until the guaranties were properly revoked or terminated. While this could be done by written
notice, it is only fair and reasonable
that the notice must be clear and
unequivocal.
544 P.2d at 884

(emphasis added).

Applying this rule, this

Court held that a letter stating that "we will withdraw the
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In

Continuing Guaranty" but also requesting that "the

guaran~

be immediately reduced" to a given amount was not sufficient
either to terminate or to reduce the guarantor's obligation,
In this case, the alleged letter does not even request that
INA be notified that defendant Nielsen wishes to revoke his
personal indemnity agreement; rather, it merely asks that
the ATC notify INA of the change of ownership.
The facts of Insurance Company of North America v.
Hoyt, 419 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1969), parallel precisely the
facts of the present case.

In Hoyt, the majority stock-

holder in a travel agency executed a personal indemnity
agreement with INA in consideration of its inclusion of his
travel agency on a Schedule Bond guaranteeing the agency's
remittances to the ATC.

This agreement contained the

precise language at issue here.

Shortly after a purported

sale of the personal indemnitor's stock, the travel agency
defaulted.

The ATC filed a sworn proof-of-loss with INA a~

INA paid its coverage limit.

INA then sued the personal

indemnitor, seeking reimbursement of its loss and expenses.
The personal indemnitor in Hoyt defended INA's
action on the basis that he had placed a telephone call to
an INA executive informing him that he wished to be relieved
of his indemnity obligation.

Characterizing this commu-

nication of a mere expression of the indemnitor's desires,
the court rejected the claim that the indemni tor's obligatlC'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-24-

had been terminated:
[W]e hold as a matter of law that there
was no cancellation of [the indemnitor's]
liability as indemnitor of [INA's] surety
obligation before default. The question
is not whether [the personal indemnitor]
"wanted" to cancel his indemnity obligation,
but rather whether what he actually did had
the effect of cancellation.
419 F.2d at 1151 (emphasis added).

Defendant Nielsen's

alleged communication to the ATC--not even to INA--expressing
his desire that his indemnity obligation be canceled is,
therfore, not sufficient to relieve him of liability under
his express promise to indemnify INA.

D.

Lanseair's Default Occurred While the ATC Was Entitled

to Protection under the Bond,
It is defendant Nielsen's secondary contention in
this appeal that INA's payment to the ATC on account of the
Lanseair default was gratituous and, therefore, he has no
obligation under his personal indemnity agreement.

The

trial court ruled against defendant Nielsen on this point,
finding that the Schedule Bond remained in effect, as to
Lanseair, through October 10, 1974, (R. at 384 and 388) but
that the defaults occurred in September, 1974 (R. at 386 and
389).

These Findings are supported by substantial evidence

and defendant Nielsen has failed to demonstrate any error.
The bond under which Lanseair was included provided,
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in pertinent part, that:
If Surety shall so elect, liability
assumed with respect to any named Travel
Agent may be canceled by giving 30 days
written notice, sent by regular mail, to
the last known address of Obligee and
Travel Agent(s).
The Surety, however,
will remain liable for any default
occuring during the period up to the
expiration of said 30 days notice.
Exhibit 15-P at

~14

(emphasis added).

Accordingly, INA could

terminate its obligation under the Schedule Bond only by
giving 30 days notice.

Defendant Nielsen acknowledges in

his Brief that the annual premium due September 1, 1974, was
never paid.

(Br. App. at 13.)

Within ten days after

Lanseair's premium payment became delinquent, INA acted to
protect not only its interests but also those of defendant
Nielsen by giving the required 30 days notice both to the
ATC and to Lanseair that the inclusion of Lanseair would be
terminated effective October 10, 1974.
20-P.)

(Exhibits 9-P and

It was the testimony of Mrs. Darlene Dolan that, in

this respect, INA acted in its usual manner.
R. at 764.)

(Tr. at 193;

Accordingly, the trial court's Finding that

INA's bond obligation to the ATC remained in force with
respect to Lanseair through the date of the loss is supported by substantial evidence.
The personal indemnity agreement that de~endant
Nielsen executed expressly provides that it covers losses

-26-
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under the "Schedule Bond, or any continuation thereof or any
successory obligation in the same or a different amount . .
(Exhibit 1-P).

This precise language was construed by

the court in Insurance Company of North America v. Hoyt,
supra.

In that case, the travel agency first applied for

inclusion under INA's Schedule Bond for the calendar year
1963.

As in this case, both the corporate travel agency and

the personal indemnitor were required to execute indemnity
agreements.

The travel agency again applied for inclusion

under the Schedule Bond for the year 1964 and the personal
indemnitor was again requested to sign an indemnity agreement.

In 1965, the travel agency paid the annual premium,

but the personal indemnitor was not asked to sign a separate
indemnity agreement.

The travel agency defaulted during

1965, and INA was compelled to make payment to the ATC under
its bond.

Thereafter, INA sought reimbursement from the

personal indemnitor, who defended on the basis that his
personal indemnity agreement, which had been executed in
1964, had expired.

The court rejected this contention,

holding:
We think the agreements plainly bind
both [the travel agency and the personal
indemnitor] to continue as indemnitors
as long as [the agency] was "included
. in the aforesaid Schedule Bond, or
any continuation thereof."
[The agency]
paid the premium for 1965 and was included
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in the Schedule Bond.
[The personal
indemnitor's) indemnity obligation accordingly remained .

There is no merit therefore in the
argument that the personal indemnity had
expired by its own terms before the June
1965 loss.
The indemnity obligation had
no definite term of duration. The agreements ran from year to year upon approved
application or, after 1964, upon payment
of premium.
[The travel agency] paid the
premium for the bond coverage for the full
year of 1965 and thus the agreements were
in effect during that year.
. The
evidence here is plain that the indemnity
was continuous, but its duration was
terminated by the failure to pay in advance
annually the premium required.
419 F.2d at 1150-51.

By the same reasoning, defendant

Nielsen's obligation to INA continued in this case until

I~

had been able to relieve itself of its obligations to the
ATC by giving the required 30-day notice.

Defendant Nielsen

relies upon the last sentence quoted above, claiming that it
means that his obligations ceased immediately upon the
failure of Lanseair to pay its premium.

The rationale

behind the court's opinion, however, makes clear that the
personal indemnitor's obligations were to be concurrent witl
and to continue so long as INA's obligations to the ATC.
When Lanseair failed to pay its annual premium,
INA immediately gave the ATC the required 30-day notice.
The default of Lanseair occurred within that 30-day period;
therefore, the default was covered under the bond.

Defen-

dant Nielsen's obligations to INA continued until INA had
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successfully relieved itself of its obligations to the ATC.
The trial court's ruling so finding is supported by the
uncontradicted evidence.

E.

The Trial Court's Evidentiary Rulings Are Correct, but

Any Technical Errors Are Harmless in Any Event.

Defendant

Nielsen challenges the trial court's decision to receive in
evidence a number of exhibits unfavorable to him.

None of

these challenges is valid.
(1)

The Schedule Bond.

The Schedule Bond

(Exhibit 15-P) was admitted by the trial court over defendant Nielsen's objection.

A review of the Transcript will

reveal, however, that the only objection to the admission of
this bond was that it was hearsay:
MR. GARRETT:
If Your Honor please, we
object to Exhibit 15 on the grounds
that there is no proper foundation
showing that Lanseair Travel had any
knowledge of the contents of this
bond.
It's hearsay as far as they
are concerned.
Transcript at 152-53 (R. at 723-24).

The objection that the

bond was hearsay is without merit because the bond was admitted
not for the purpose of proving the truth of any statement
contained in it, but rather for the purpose of establishing
its terms and provisions and the conditions of INA's obligation to the ATC.

Any objection that the copy of the bond

actually received as Exhibit 15-P was not the best evidence
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of the provisions of the Schedule Bond was waived since, as
reported by American Jurisprudence, the rule is that on
appeal a party will be limited
to the specific objections to evidence
made at the trial, and the appellate
court will consider only such grounds of
objection as are specified.
In other
words, a party is confined to the specific objections made by him and can
have the benefit of no others.
75 ArnJur 2d Trial, §167 at 255.

See also, State v. Kelbach,

23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297 (1969); State v. Valdez,
19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P.2d 53 (1967); Porcupine Reservoir
Company v. Lloyd W. Keller Corporation, 15 Utah 2d 318, 392
P. 2d 620 ( 1964); Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272
P.2d 185 (1954).
Moreover, even if viewed as hearsay, the exhibit
was clearly admissible under the business records exception.
The trial court's admission of the exhibit was entirely
proper.
(2)

The Documents Received by the ATC.

Defendant Nielsen also complains (Br. App. at 19-20) that
the trial court admitted exhibits and permitted testimony o'
loss substantiation submitted to the ATC by the airlines.
Mrs. Darlene Dolan evaluated these claims and relied upon
them in preparing the proof-of-loss submitted to HJII..
at 167-68; R. at 738-39.)

(Tr.

For example, Exhibit 37-P is a

compilation of the claims in regard to the Lanseair defaui:
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(complete with supporting photostatic copies of passenger
tickets and debit memos) submitted by the airlines to the
ATC; Exhibit 36-P is a CPA's verification of the airlines'
claims which was received by Mrs. Dolan as an attachment to
INA's request (Exhibit 27-P) that a formal proof-of-loss be
prepared and submitted; and Exhibit 28-P is the formal
proof-of-loss sworn to by

~rs.

Dolan on behalf of the ATC

and submitted to INA.
At trial, defendant Nielsen objected to the
admission of these exhibits as hearsay.

The court admitted

the exhibits on the basis that even if hearsay they were
admissible under the so-called business records exception to
Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides:
Evidence of a statement which is
made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated
is hearsay evidence and inadmissible
except:

(13)
Business entries and the
like. Writings offered as memoranda
or records of acts, conditions or
events to prove the facts stated
therein, if the judge finds that they
were made in the regular course of a
business at or about the time of the
act, condition or event recorded, and
that the sources of information from
which made and the method and circumstances of their preparation were
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such as to indicate their trustworthiness
Rule 63 Utah Rules of Evidence (emphasis added) .

The proof-

of-loss (Exhibit 28-P), the airlines' claims (Exhibit 37-P),
and the evaluation thereof (Exhibits 27-P and 36-P) were
admitted not to prove the truth of the statements made
therein (i.e. that a loss in a certain dollar amount had
occurred) , but to prove that INA had demanded and received
reasonable evidence from the ATC of the losses sustained
a result of Lanseair's default.
exhibits are not hearsay.

~

For this purpose, the

All other possible objections

~

the admission of these exhibits were waived by defendant
Nielsen's failure to bring such grounds, if any, to the
attention of the trial court.

(Point I (E) (1), supra. l

Moreover, even if these exhibits do constitute
hearsay, they were admissible under the business records
exception.

Each of these exhibits was produced by Mrs.

Darlene Dolan from the files of the ATC, which it was her
responsibility to maintain and control.
at 747-48.)

(Tr. at 146-47; R.

The trustworthiness of the documents is attesto

to by the fact that they were routinely produced by several
of the airlines that comprise the ATC.

There would simply

be no reason for a national airline to falsify its records
so as to enable INA to impose an unjust obligation against
defendant Nielsen.

Implicit in the trial courL's admissi~

-32-
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of these documents is a finding of trustworthiness sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of Rule 63(13).
Finally, even if the admission of all of these
exhibits was erroneous, the error would be harmless.

As

noted above, with the introduction of the indemnity agreement (Exhibit 1-P) and the canceled check by which INA made
payment to the ATC (Exhibit 32-P), INA established a prima
facie case and the burden shifted to defendant Nielsen to
demonstrate grounds sufficient to constitute a defense,
which he failed to do.

Therefore, even if all of the other

exhibits received by the trial court were erroneously
received, there is still sufficient evidence properly
admitted to support the Judgment entered against defendant
Nielsen.
(3)

The Alleged Credits.

Defendant Nielsen

also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to
admit Exhibit 45-D, which consisted of auditor's coupons,
void flight coupons, and audit detail in connection with
credit card sales.

(Tr. at 247; R. at 818.)

Defendant

Nielsen claimed that these materials constituted a credit to
be allowed as an offset against his liability to INA.

The

trial court, however, refused to admit the exhibit on the
basis that neither defendant Nielsen nor anyone else had
brought the alleged credits to the attention of INA prior
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to its payment to the ATC on January 22, 1975.
55;

R. at 822-26.)

(Tr. at25:.

The trial court thus found that defend 0

Nielsen had waived or become estopped to assert any claim'.
these credits by his dilatory conduct.

(R. at 386 and 391.

Defendant Nielsen attempted to introduce the

a~:

detail allegedly constituting this credit through the
testimony of Rulon DeYoung.

It was Mr. DeYoung's own

testimony, however, that these "credits" were not

present~

even to the ATC prior to INA's payment of the Lanseair
claim:
MR. DART:
If I could voir dire one
more question, during the time
that you had these tickets
that may or may not be credits,
were they ever presented to the
Air Traffic Conference to be
treated by them and be reviewed
by them to determine if they
would give you a credit for
them prior to February, 1975?
MR. DeYOUNG:

To my knowledge, no.

Transcript at 252 (R. at 823).

Thus, when INA paid the

ATC's claim on January 22, 1975, these alleged credits hac
never been mentioned; the Record firmly supports the trial
court's ruling.
Moreover, when advised of the apparent Lanseair
default, defendant Nielsen made no effort to bring any
"credits" to the attention of either the ATC or INA; he
merely proclaimed that his alleged letter of August 23, l~·
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shielded him from all liability.

Exhibit 3-P, for example,

was received into evidence without objection.

That exhibit

is a copy both of INA's letter to defendant Nielsen and of
his response, written across the bottom, that "the enclosed
copy of letter mailed to Air Traffic Conference should be
self-explanatory."

He made no mention of "credits".

Likewise, in response to a similar notification
from Marsh and McLennan, INA's broker in the District of
Columbia, defendant Nielsen responded on November 4, 1974,
merely with the assertion that he had relieved himself of
all liability under the indemnity agreement.
no mention of the credits he now claims.

Again, he made

(Exhibit 2-P.)

Moreover, it is significant to note that in the course of
making a proffer to the trial court, defendant Nielsen's
counsel stated:
I would further offer the fact that,
Your Honor, when the first demand was made
upon Lanseair and Mr. Nielsen by anyone in
this matter and before the bonding company
paid the claim that they were advised as
to the existence of these credits.
Now, I think there may be a letter
that I can offer in support of that if
I can have a moment--if I may have a
moment, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Why don't we take a
recess at this point and give you a
moment.
Transcript at 255-56

(R. at 826-27).

When court resumed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-35-

session some twenty minutes later Mr. Garrett acknowledged:
I have been unable to locate the
letter that I thought existed.
I thought
it was in evidence to the bonding company
concerning the credits.
Transcript at 256 (R. at 827).

No such letter was ever

offered on behalf of defendant Nielsen.

Accordingly, the

evidence is uncontradicted that INA had no notice of defendant Nielsen's claim to a credit or offset against his
liability until after it had made payment to the ATC on
January 22, 1975, based upon the proof-of-loss and extensiw
documentation submitted by the ATC.

II.

THE ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED TO INA SHOULD BE

INCREASED.
The personal indemnity agreement signed by defend;
Nielsen provides for the payment of "any and all loss,
costs, charges, suits, damages, counsel fees, and expenses
(Exhibit 1-P.)

of whatever kind or nature

The

original complaint in this action was filed on June 7, 1971
Since that time, defendant Nielsen has vigorously sought tt
avoid the obligations undertaken in his personal indemni~
agreement.

Following entry of Judgment on March 19, 1979,

defendant Nielsen filed a Motion "to alter and amend findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter a new judgme:
(R. at 399-410.)

Following the denial of this Motion on
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July 23, 1979 (R. at 412-13), defendant Nielsen filed his
Notice of Appeal to this Court (R. at 414 and 426).
Accordingly, INA has been forced to continue the
services of its attorneys not only to defend defendant
Nielsen's post-judgment motions, but also to defend this
appeal.

Since defendant Nielsen has agreed that he will

reimburse INA for all attorneys fees reasonably incurred, it
is appropriate that the fees awarded to INA be increased in
recognition of the additional services rendered since the
entry of the original Judgment on March 19, 1979.
The propriety of an additional award on account of
attorney's fees incurred on appeal was recognized by this
Court in Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment
Company, 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955).

The trial

court in that case had refused to award any attorneys fees
to the prevailing purchasers under a uniform real estate
contract of which the vendor had sought to declare a forfeiture.

This court reversed, holding:
[W]e are of the opinion that the stipulated amount of such fee should cover
services rendered in the court below
and on appeal. Attorneys' fees on
appeal are discretionary with this court

279 P.2d at 711 (emphasis added).

Although this Court did

not, in the cited case, make a specific award of attorneys
fees on account of the appeal, the principle that such fees
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may be awarded is clearly stated.
The precise question whether a surety is entitled
to an additonal award against its personal indemnitor for
attorneys fees incurred by the surety on appeal was reached
by the Oregon Supreme Court in Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Company v. Maus, 514 P.2d 61 (Ore. 1973).

In

that case, the surety brought an action against the persona:
indemnitor to recover a loss that it had paid on his behalf.
The personal indemni tor prevailed at the trial court and the
surety appealed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in

favor of the surety; thereafter, a petition was filed by tk
surety to recover its additional attorneys fees incurred oc
the appeal.

The indemnity agreement, like that present in

this case, provided that the personal indemnitor would

p~

"any and all liability for damages, loss, costs, charges,
and expenses of whatsoever kind or nature (including coumi
and attorney's fees)

514 P.2d at 61.

The Oregon

Supreme Court held that, in view of this language, an
additional award based upon the attorneys fees incurred by
the surety should be entered against the personal indemni tor.

The court awarded $1,500 in additional fees.

P.2d at 62.
In Maus, a surety appealing from an ac1verse
judgment was held entitled to an award of additional
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514

attorneys fees incurred on appeal;

~

fortiori, INA is

entitled to an award of additional attorneys fees incurred
in defending this appeal from a judgment in its favor.
However, in view of this Court's holding in
Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978), plaintiffrespondent INA hereby abandons the remaining portion of its
cross-appeal in which it asserted that the trial court's
award of only $3,000 in attorneys fees should be set aside
since the uncontradicted evidence was that the reasonable
amount of such fees was not less than $6,000.

CONCLUSION
There is much evidence to support each of the
Findings made by the trial court, and defendant Nielsen has
failed to delineate a single Finding that is not supported

by substantial evidence.

Upon the introduction of the

personal indemnity agreement and the canceled check by which
INA made payment on account of Lanseair's default, INA
established a prima facie case against defendant Nielsen,
which he failed to rebut.
As his principal line of defense, defendant
Nielsen contends that his obligations to INA were terminated

by an incorrectly addressed letter that he alleges he mailed
to the ATC on August 23, 1974.

An employee of the addressee

testified that there was no indication of the letter having
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f~:

ever been received, and the clear inference to be drawn
her testimony was that the letter had not been received.

The trial court's finding that the letter was never receive:
is well supported by the Record.
Even if the alleged letter had been received by
the ATC, it would have been insufficient to terminate
defendant Nielsen's obligation since the ATC was not an
agent of INA.

Additionally, even if received, the notice

would not have been given in time to terminate defendant
Nielsen's obligations prior to Lanseair's default because
INA was entitled to a resonable time to protect its interes·
Finally, the letter upon which defendant Nielsen relies is
not a clear and precise statement that he wishes to be
relieved of his indemnity obligations; it is not addressed
to the surety and it requests only that the ATC advise INA
of the change of ownership.
Defendant Nielsen's secondary contention that tli
trial court erred in finding that the bond remained in faro
~e

at the time of this loss is, likewise, without merit.

Schedule Bond provided that INA could terminate its obli~·
tion to the ATC only upon 30-day notice.

Lanseair's

prY~

to INA became delinquent September 1, 1974, and almost
immediately thereafter INA gave notice to the ATC that the
inclusion of Lanseair on the Schedule Bond would be ter~~
October 10, 1974.

Defendant Nielsen agreed that his persc:
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indemnity agreement should continue through "any continuation"
of the bond, therefore, his contention that merely because
the premium had become delinquent, he was automatically
relieved of all liability is without merit.
Also without merit is defendant Nielsen's conplaint
that the trial court erred in admitting a copy of the
Schedule Bond over his objection that it was hearsay.

Since

the bond was not offered to prove the truth of any statement
it contained, but only to prove the terms and provisions of
the bond, it did not constitute hearsay and was properly
admitted.

Any other possible basis of objection was waived

by defendant Nielsen's failure to raise it.

The same

reasoning applies to the admission of documentation submitted to the ATC by the airlines.

Moreover, even if viewed

as hearsay, these exhibits were clearly admissible under the
business record exception.
Defendant Nielsen's final complaint is that the
trial court erred in failing to allow alleged credits as an
offset.

The trial court rejected evidence of these "credits"

on the basis that defendant Nielsen had waived or become
~stopped

to assert them against INA.

In response to noti-

fication from INA of Lanseair's default and its intention to
look to defendant Nielsen for reimbursement, defendant
Nielsen replied merely that he had terminated his indemnity;

-41Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

he made no effort to advise INA of the existence of the
alleged credits.

There is ample evidence to support the

trial court's ruling that, not having been timely raised,
these credits could not constitute an offset.
The personal indemnity agreement signed by defenda'
Nielsen expressly provides that he will reimburse INA for
all attorneys fees and other expenses incurred.

After the

trial court awarded INA $3,000 as its attorneys fee, INA ha 0
been compelled to defend defendant Nielsen's post-judgment
motions and this appeal.

Accordingly, INA is entitled toll

additional award representing the further attorneys fees
incurred.
There being ample evidence in the record to
support the trial court's judgment in favor of INA, that
judgment must be affirmed; it is appropriate, however, that
an additional award be made on account of the attorney's
fees incurred by INA since trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

i\ ~

11

;.t.L

day of March,

1980.

By
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